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Book Review 
The United States Patent Reform Quagmire: A 
Balanced Proposal 
INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN 
PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND 
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT.  By Adam B. Jaffe 
& Josh Lerner.  2004.  Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press.  Pp. ix, 236. 
Reviewed by Michael S. Mireles, Jr.* 
[I]n the space of less than a decade, we converted the 
weapon that a patent represents from something like a handgun 
or a pocket knife into a bazooka, and then started handing out 
the bazookas to pretty much anyone who asked for one . . . .  The 
result has been a dangerous and expensive arms’ race, which 
now undermines rather than fosters the crucial process of 
technological innovation  (p. 35). 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to 
enact a patent law to secure in inventors the right to their 
discoveries for a limited time to promote the progress of the 
useful arts.1  The Constitution recognizes that in order to 
provide an incentive for inventors to create new inventions the 
government must create a property right in the intangible 
invention;2 thus, federal patent law recognizes a patent holder’s 
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling a 
patented invention.3  Without this property right, it is feared 
                                                          
 * NEED BIO INFORMATION 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See  35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the 
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that there will not be a sufficient incentive for inventors to 
invent because the public nature of information goods enables 
others to easily free ride on the efforts of the inventor, and thus 
the inventor will be unable to recoup her investment in the 
development of that invention.4  As such, patent law is a key 
driver behind technological innovation in the United States.5 
Notwithstanding the understood purpose of patent law, it 
is unclear whether United States patent law and policy 
actually achieves this purpose, or even if patent law and policy 
is necessary to achieve the purported goal of the United States 
patent system—to promote the progress of the useful arts.  
Some would argue that the government should pay people or 
companies to invent or provide prizes to those that invent; 
others argue that a first mover advantage coupled with trade 
secret protection is a sufficient incentive to innovate.6  Those 
arguments are beyond the scope of this review, but are 
important to keep in mind as proposals to reform patent law 
are considered.  This review addresses the former question—
whether United States patent policy effectively provides an 
incentive for invention, or perhaps even more critically, is 
United States patent policy standing in the way of the its 
purported purpose, the progress of useful arts. 
The question of patent reform is not new and has been the 
recent subject of much debate.  Some questions of patent 
                                                          
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1017, 1024-26 (1989). 
 4. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 8 (2003) [hereinafter 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY].  The patent system provides another benefit by 
increasing the storehouse of public knowledge by requiring a patentee to 
provide an enabling disclosure of the invention.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); see 
also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The basic quid pro quo 
contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent 
monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with 
substantial utility.”); JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 
22 (2003). But see generally Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: 
Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1315 (2004) (arguing against use of social contract theory as basis for 
patent grant and proposing the use of a regulatory theory). 
 5. See generally John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing 
Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77 (2002) 
(concluding that a theory of heightened patent value due to the increasing 
importance of patents explains several trends existing between patents issued 
between 1976 and 1978, and 1996 and 1998). 
 6. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1026-27; Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature 
and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 288 (1977). 
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reform are driven by the quest for global patent law 
harmonization, which raises issues concerning United States 
law and policy versus those of other countries.7  Other 
questions are driven by whether United States patent policy is 
operating at its most efficient level—promoting innovation 
while maintaining a rich public domain.  Questions concerning 
global patent harmonization often raise fundamental issues 
about the United States’ concerns with protecting the small 
inventor or company—the idealized driver of innovation in the 
United States economy.  And, as discussed in this review, the 
issues concerning protecting small inventors and companies, as 
well as related questions of protectionism, loom large. 
Another recurring theme in United States patent law and 
policy reform debates is the quest for certainty.  Inherently, 
patent protection itself is uncertain.  The very nature of 
attempting to reduce the intangible invention into words 
describing the boundaries of the patentably distinct material is 
immensely difficult and fraught with uncertainty.8  The effort 
to then apply the words delineating the scope of the protection 
of the intangible back to a tangible accused infringing device or 
practice, let alone its equivalent, injects another layer of 
uncertainty.  Moreover, a body of law, which by definition 
attempts to protect the unknown, must be uncertain.  Further 
compounding the lack of certainty is the very technical nature 
of what is being protected—often a new technology which is not 
completely understood by those skilled in the art, let alone 
judges, attorneys and juries.  Finally, the social and economic 
values of a patented invention are unclear. 
For these reasons, patent reform is currently a very 
                                                          
 7. Cf. John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685 (2002) (arguing that while there have been problems 
with each country having its own patent system, the total effect of diversity 
leads to advancement in innovation). 
 8. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. Ltd., 535 
U.S. 722, 731 (2002).  
An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a 
series of drawings.  A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought 
written to satisfy the requirements of patent law. This conversion of 
machine to words allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot be 
satisfactorily filled. Often the invention is novel and words do not 
exist to describe it. The dictionary does not always keep abreast of the 
inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for the sake of words, but 
words for things. 
Id. (quoting Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 
1967)). 
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popular topic.  Critics point to a purported expanding definition 
of patent eligible subject matter,9 a weakening of the 
enablement requirement,10 the slow death of the experimental 
use exception,11 patent law trumping antitrust law,12 and 
generally higher rates of patents upheld and infringed at the 
appellate level.13  Adding fuel to the fire of reform are clear 
examples of inventions that are neither new nor nonobvious as 
required by the patent statutes, but which are nonetheless 
covered by granted patents and are even being litigated.  The 
two most notable examples are Smucker’s patent covering the 
peanut butter and jelly sandwich14 and Amazon’s one click 
patent.15 
The most recent questions of patent reform ask whether 
patent rights are too strong and too easy to obtain, and thus 
impede innovation rather than promote it.  For example, a 
conundrum of patent law, particularly with more recently 
patentable technologies such as software and biotechnology, is 
that the patent right may be needed as an incentive to create 
the invention, but access to that patented invention may be 
needed by others to continue to innovate.16  Finding the most 
efficient balance in patent law between invention in the first 
instance and access for further innovation is difficult.  The 
practical answer to the problem is transferring rights, which 
generally works well, but avoids, and does not solve, the 
balance question.17 
                                                          
 9. John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System:  
A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 305 (2001). 
 10. See generally Dale L. Carlson, Katarzyna Przychodzen & Petra 
Scamborova, Patent Linchpin for the 21st century? – Best mode Revisited,  87 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 89, 94 (2005). 
 11. See generally Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of a Compromised Solution 
to the Problem Arising From Patenting Biomedical Research Tools,  20 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347 (2004). 
 12. See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust’s Troubled Relations with 
Intellectual Property, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1695 (2003). 
 13.    Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable 
Administrative Revocation System for US Patent Law, 11 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 
9 (1997). 
 14. U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (issued Dec. 21, 1999). 
 15. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999). 
 16. See PAUL A. DAVID, THE ECONOMIC LOGIC OF “OPEN SCIENCE” AND 
THE BALANCE BETWEEN PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
IN SCIENTIFIC DATA AND INFORMATION: A PRIMER 9–10 (Stanford Inst. for 
Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 02-30,2003), at 
http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/02-30.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). 
 17. Empirical evidence of whether patents are impeding innovation and 
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Proposals on patent reform have come from many fronts 
including the Federal Trade Commission,18 the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO),19 and the National 
Academy of Sciences.20  In Innovation and Its Discontents: How 
Our Broken Patent System Is Endangering Innovation and 
Progress, and What To Do About It, economists Adam Jaffee 
and Josh Lerner rely upon over two decades of research 
concerning innovation policy to paint a picture of the problem 
and offer balanced proposals for reform.  Their ambitious 
analysis of the problem and their proposals for reform are 
thoughtful and beautifully written.  While some may disagree 
at the margins with the characterization of the problem, as well 
as with the proposals for reform, the work advances 
understanding of the issues related to United States patent 
reform and provides a glimpse into problems associated with 
global harmonization efforts. 
The authors in an urgent yet cautious voice argue that the 
patent system is not functioning properly and has tipped 
toward creating and enforcing patent rights that are too strong 
and may impede innovation (pp. 34-35).  The authors are 
cautious because they recognize the importance of the patent 
system in promoting innovation (35-51), including the 
presumption that patents are valid and must be invalidated by 
clear and convincing evidence (pp. 192-95), and that the 
strength of the patent right has ebbed and flowed often based 
on public opinion (ch. 3).21  The authors trace the patent debate 
from monopolies granted by the Queen of England for products 
and services that were clearly not new and nonobvious to 
                                                          
whether parties are unable to efficiently transfer rights has been difficult to 
collect in the biotechnology industry.  See id. at 13–16.  The current evidence 
indicates that parties are sometimes solving the problem of access through 
transferring rights.  Id. 
 18. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER 
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005). 
 19. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC 
PLAN (2003), at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/stratplan03feb2003.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
 20. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., A PATENT SYSTEM 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004), at 
http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 
2005). 
 21. See generally Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L. J. 899 (2002) (arguing that proposals for dramatic patent law reform should 
be viewed with skepticism in light of the history of the reform debate). 
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England’s 16th Century patent system that involved a 
burdensome and corrupt multi-stage process for obtaining a 
patent (pp. 80-90).  The authors continue with the 19th 
Century reform of the English patent system which drove the 
industrial revolution, and the Dutch abolition of their patent 
system (pp. 80-90).  The authors recognize that the problems of 
today are not new and that the process of understanding the 
problems and proposing solutions to them should be informed 
by the lessons of history (p. 79).  Such lessons include the 
principle that there are no easy solutions to the problems of 
running a patent system because of the inherent trade off 
between burdening commerce, competitors, and other inventors 
and rewarding inventors (p.79).  Also included is the idea that 
the process of change in the patent system resembles a 
pendulum which all too often swings too far in one direction 
thereby creating new problems (p. 79). 
The authors argue that the United States, through two 
administrative changes, has swung the pendulum to the 
direction of patent rights, which are too strong and impede 
innovation.  First, Congress took funds from the USPTO, 
depriving it of much needed resources resulting in poor patent 
quality (ch. 5).  Second, Congress created the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), which has 
greatly expanded patentable eligible subject matter and 
strengthened the patent right (ch. 4).  The combination of the 
effect of these two changes—strengthening patent rights and 
weakening the standards for granting patents—along with the 
effect of such changes manifesting in critically important 
industries to the United States economy, has created a “‘perfect 
storm,’ a complex and intensifying policy mess rather than a 
gently swinging pendulum” (p. 97).  The authors’ proposals 
provide a multi-step process to ensure better patent quality 
through the creation of incentives to allow third parties to 
bring information concerning prior art to the USPTO and allow 
judges to determine issues concerning validity instead of juries 
(ch. 7).  This essay will examine and review the authors’ 
arguments concerning why patent reform is necessary and 
their proposals for fixing the problem. 
I.  JAFFE AND LERNER: WHY DO WE NEED PATENT 
REFORM? 
The authors argue that patent law reform is necessary 
because a primary institutional mechanism to promote 
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innovation—the patent system—is likely stifling innovation.  
According to the authors, the USPTO is issuing patents that do 
not meet the requisite minimal levels of patentability 
established by statutory and case law (p. 11).  Patents are 
granted for innovations that are not novel and/or nonobvious, 
that is, the inventions already are in the public domain or 
would be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the particular art.  
Second, patent holders are more likely to bring an infringement 
suit based on a questionable patent against a potential 
infringer because courts are more likely to find that patent 
valid and infringed (pp. 13-16). 
Compounding the problem, potential infringers are less 
likely to challenge the patent in court because of the cost and 
are more likely to take a license, thus diverting resources that 
could be used for further innovation (pp. 13-16).  Smaller 
companies may be unable to innovate because of a crowded 
field of patents and true innovators may be threatened with 
questionable patents held by companies that are not innovating 
(pp. 13-16).  Firms may have to raise the price of their products 
or services or may even abandon specific research agendas to 
develop particular products because of the litigation and 
licensing costs associated with developing those products 
(pp.16-19).  This could mean higher prices for consumers 
because of fewer substitutes and fewer products and services to 
meet their needs (pp. 40-41).  As a result of greater patenting 
and the greater likelihood that patents will be enforced, the 
innovation process could be stifled because of a web of 
uncertain patent rights, threat of litigation, and protracted 
licensing negotiations (p. 59).  Rather than providing incentives 
to promote innovation, the patent system is encouraging 
wasteful conduct and is failing to promote innovation (p. 2). 
In exploring the cause of these issues, the authors 
discussed two pieces of legislation enacted by Congress that do 
not directly modify the substantive patent law and appear, at 
first blush, to be merely administrative changes: changing the 
USPTO into an entity run by fees instead of tax dollars and 
creating the CAFC (chs. 4-5). 
II.  FLEECING THE USPTO 
Why is the USPTO issuing patents for inventions that do 
not meet the standards that must be met as required by law, 
specifically Title 35 of the U.S. Code and binding Supreme 
Court and CAFC case law?  The law has not changed 
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substantially in the last twenty years—novelty and 
nonobviousness are still the gatekeepers to patentability,22 the 
guardians of the public domain.  The authors argue that 
Congress, in the early 1990s, changed the structure of fees 
charged by the USPTO and the financing of the USPTO.  
Congress treated the USPTO as an entity that is maintained by 
the fees it collects from its clients, the patent applicants (p. 11).  
As a result of this shift, the USPTO views itself as an 
organization whose purpose is to benefit its customers—again, 
the patent applicants (p. 11).  Patent applicants simply want 
one thing, an issued patent (p. 11).  Moreover, the shift has 
created incentives for the USPTO to process applications 
quickly and for the lowest cost, which consequently results in 
lower quality issued patents and patents that should not have 
been issued in the first place (p. 11).  As a result, patent 
applicants have an incentive to file patent applications covering 
inventions that are likely not new and/or nonobvious (p. 11).  
Coupled with an increase in applications because of CAFC 
rulings expanding patent eligible subject matter, the examiners 
at the USPTO are unable to conduct a meaningful review of 
patent applications (p. 20).  Accordingly, examiners often will 
have an incomplete body of prior art to compare to the asserted 
claims in the patent application (pp.139-42).23  Additionally, 
the USPTO is particularly bad at performing prior art searches 
for new industries because there are few issued patents and the 
USPTO does a very poor job of accessing other prior art such as 
scientific journals and informal know how (pp. 141-42). 
Moreover, instead of allowing the USPTO to keep the fees 
it generates, Congress has been siphoning off fees from the 
USPTO (p. 20).  Empirical evidence appears to support an 
argument that weakening patent standards and a rise in the 
number of applications has led to an increase in issued patents 
and applications for patents (pp. 11-12).  The number of patents 
granted per year roughly tripled between 1983 and 2002, from 
62,000 per year to 177,000 per year, as compared to annual 
increases of less than one percent for the years between 1930 
and 1982 (pp. 11-12).  Moreover, due to the cumulative and 
overlapping nature of the process of developing a new product 
                                                          
 22. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2000). 
 23. See generally Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better 
Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763 (2002) (offers proposals to bridge 
the information gap between patent examiners and the patent applicant and 
her competitors). 
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in new technological fields, such as biotechnology and 
semiconductors, the problem is compounded as parties may 
have to obtain licenses to multiple potentially questionable 
patents to develop a product (pp. 59 -68). 
Very few would argue that the USPTO has not been fleeced 
by Congress, which has resulted in a number of patents of 
questionable validity.  Recently, Congress has reacted to 
concerns relating to the funding of the USPTO and has passed 
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005.24  The Act allows 
the USPTO to increase the fees it charges to fund goals of the 
USPTO, including hiring a large number of new examiners.25  
President Bush’s 2006 budget submitted to Congress provides 
for $1.703 billion to operate the Patent and Trademark Office 
which allows the “PTO full access to its fee collections in 
2006.”26  The question of whether the funding will continue to 
flow and will be used wisely remains to be seen. 
III.  CAFC 
The second question presented by Jaffe and Lerner is why 
patent owners are more likely to bring an infringement suit, 
have their patent upheld by a court, and obtain a large 
monetary award for infringement.  The authors argue that the 
problem has been caused by Congress’ creation in 1982 of a 
specialized appellate court, the CAFC (ch. 4).27  The CAFC is 
tasked with hearing almost all appeals from the district courts, 
                                                          
 24. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 
2809 (2004).  The Act enacted “fee increases averaging 15-20 percent . . . [and] 
provides that these fee changes will expire after two years.”  Hayden Gregory, 
Congress Increases PTO User Fees and Provides Substantial Additional 
Funding for the PTO, LEGISLATIVE NEWSLETTER (ABA Section of Intellectual 
Prop. Law), Nov. 22, 2004 (email newsletter) (on file with author). 
 25. John Schoen, US Patent Office Swamped by Backlog, MSNBC NEWS,  
Apr. 27, 2004, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4788834/ (last visited Mar. 20, 
2005). 
 26. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: FEDERAL 
FUNDS (2005), available at 
http://www.aipla.org/html/reports/2005/PTO2006Budget.pdf (last visited Apr. 
10, 2005); OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 75 (2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/budget/commerce.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
 27. See generally Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 
(2003) (arguing that CAFC is poorly equipped for fact finding which has led to 
an institutional design that is inefficient and produces technologically 
questionable decisions in individual cases).  
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the International Trade Commission, and the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences concerning patents.28  Prior to the 
formation of the CAFC, each regional circuit heard appeals 
from patent cases filed in district courts in each respective 
region (p. 98).  The authors assert that the CAFC has made it 
easier for applicants to receive patents, patent owners to 
enforce their patents, courts to uphold patents as valid, and 
patent owners to receive large monetary awards from 
infringement, and is thus decidedly pro-patent (ch. 4).  
Specifically, the authors argue the CAFC has encouraged the 
filing of patents by expanding the scope of patent eligible 
subject matter to include business methods, software, and some 
biotechnology products and processes; weakening the standards 
of novelty and nonobviousness for granting patents; and 
improving the enforceability of the patents making those 
patents more commercially valuable (pp. 110-25).  The authors 
cite statistical evidence that demonstrates that in the first four 
years of the CAFC’s operation, the patent holder won sixty-
eight percent of patent cases (p. 106).  The sixty-eight percent 
success rate is higher than the success rate that patentees 
obtained in the Tenth Circuit, the most pro-patent circuit 
under the past system (p. 106).  Thus, according to the authors, 
the CAFC did not standardize patent practice, but instead 
shifted patent practice to be more pro-patent (p. 106).  The 
authors also point to the fact that “[p]rior to the creation of the 
CAFC, about [thirty] percent of the patents were found to be 
valid and infringed at the district court level.  After the 
creation of the CAFC, the percentage of award upheld rose to 
over [fifty-five] percent” (p. 106).  Moreover, according to the 
authors:  
Whereas the circuit courts had affirmed [sixty-two] percent of district-
court findings of patent infringement in the three decades before the 
creation of the CAFC, the CAFC in its first eight years affirmed 
[ninety] percent of such decisions.  On the other hand, when the 
district court had found that a patent was invalid or not infringed—
thereby denying the patentee enforcement of the patent—the circuits 
had reversed only [twelve] percent of the cases.  In the first eight 
years of the Federal Circuit, [twenty-eight] percent of these cases 
were reversed (pp. 105-06). 
The authors then point to a few CAFC decisions and 
suggest the implications of those decisions (pp. 110-125).  First, 
the authors assert that the CAFC has boosted patent holder’s 
rights to receive injunctive relieve and damages for past 
                                                          
 28. See id. at 1037 n.2 (describing the jurisdictional range of the CAFC). 
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infringement (pp. 110-15).  The CAFC has increased the ability 
to obtain substantial damages with help from the Supreme 
Court, by making it easier for awardees to increase their 
damages by interest (pp. 110-11).  The CAFC has also 
encouraged the use of the lost profits standard instead of the 
reasonable royalty standard to determine past damages, and 
allowed patentees to receive the sum of damages calculated 
from lost profits and reasonable royalty standards (pp. 110-11).  
The CAFC has allowed patentees to receive preliminary 
injunctions notwithstanding the commercial nature of the harm 
because the calculation or payment of damages was uncertain 
enough to “render the harm due to infringement essentially 
irreversible” (p. 111).  According to the authors, the prospect of 
huge damage awards and sweeping injunctive relief coupled 
with poor patent quality, leads to great pressures on parties to 
settle their disputes (p. 114).  The problem with this is “the 
firm that pays royalties for an invalid patent suffers [and] 
receives less of the rewards for its own discovery than it 
deserves” (p. 115).  As an additional matter, 
the firm’s peers may be hurt: had the first firm chosen to fight the 
infringement suit, and the patent been struck down as invalid, then 
the patent-holder would be unable to pursue others in the industry . . 
. .  [T]he decision to settle can actually make it harder for others to 
challenge the asserted patent, because the patent-holder can use the 
fact that the first firm settled as evidence of the validity of the patent 
(p. 115). 
The authors argue that this raises the cost of introducing 
new products, and thus the cost of the entire innovation process 
is raised resulting in less innovation (p. 115).29 
The authors use the presumption of irreparable harm to 
demonstrate that the CAFC has made it easier for patentees to 
obtain preliminary injunctions, which demonstrates that the 
CAFC is pro-patent (pp. 110-15).  The authors do not propose 
removing the presumption of irreparable harm.30  This position 
can be viewed as consistent with the authors’ positions that the 
clear and convincing standard for proving invalidity should be 
retained as long as the quality of examination improves (pp. 
192-95).  Moreover, the determination of whether a preliminary 
injunction should issue is a decision made by the judge, which 
                                                          
 29. See also Kesan, supra note 23, at 767-68 (outlining six costs to society 
because of the issuance of bad patents). 
 30. See generally Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: 
The “Dubious Preponderance”, 19 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 923 (2004) (criticizing 
the FTC’s proposal to change standard to preponderance standard). 
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is also consistent with the authors’ general position that judges 
make more decisions concerning patent validity.  The 
presumption of irreparable harm flows from the determination 
by the district court that a clear showing of likelihood of 
success on validity and infringement is proven.31  Assuming 
patents that are not questionable are issued, the rationale for 
the grant of the presumption is a defensible one.  The rationale 
for the presumption is that the term of the patent is finite, 
patent expiration is not suspended during litigation, the 
passage of time can cause harm which cannot be remedied, and 
the opportunity to practice an invention during a likely lengthy 
patent litigation may tempt infringers.32  Moreover, “[t]he 
nature of the patent grant thus weighs against holding that 
monetary damages will always suffice to make the patentee 
whole, for the principal value of a patent is its statutory right 
to exclude.”33 
Second, the authors assert that the CAFC has expanded 
the number of things that can be patented (pp. 115-19).  The 
authors do note that the tendency towards expansion originates 
with the Supreme Court, particularly in the Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty34 opinion and the oft mentioned quote that 
“anything under the sun that is made by man”35 should be 
worthy of patent protection (p. 115). 
However, the authors state that the CAFC opened the 
doors to the patentability of software too far by allowing the 
patenting of a software program run on a generalized 
computer, rather than a specialized device (pp. 115-16).  The 
CAFC made this decision in light of the Supreme Court’s 
Diamond v. Diehr36 case, which expanded the patentability to 
include a process to cure rubber that relied upon the 
application of computer software (p. 116).37  The CAFC cleared 
up the issue of whether business methods could be 
patentable,38 which led to the patenting of methods that 
                                                          
 31. Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1983). 
 32. H.H Robertson, Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 390 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987). 
 33. Id. 
 34. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 35.   Id. at 309.  
 36. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 37.   Id. at 190-93.  
 38. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 
1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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already existed in the public domain or at least were held 
secret by third parties.  The statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 
10139 is incredibly broad with very few limitations.  Although 
the CAFC expanded patentable subject matter, it did so after 
receiving strong signals from the Supreme Court.  In 
particular, the Supreme Court noted the extremely broad 
language and clear legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 101.40 
The USPTO had a difficult time becoming knowledgeable 
about the state of the prior art in the financial industry, which 
led to the passage of the American Inventors Protection Act.41  
This Act provides an infringement exception for businesses that 
utilized business methods prior to the filing of a patent on 
those methods.42  The authors’ desire to improve examination 
standards does not include the argument that business 
methods, biotechnology, or software should not be patentable.  
Indeed, the authors note that a distinction should not be made 
between types of subject matter, but instead the policy question 
should be whether the patent system is encouraging the 
development of new products and services (pp. 199-200).  
Business methods require the investment of time and money to 
develop and may need patent protection to protect against free-
riding (pp. 199-200).  However, very few will argue against 
ensuring that only patents that are novel and nonobvious 
should issue. 
Third, the CAFC also appears willing to consider patents 
non-obvious even in the light of a substantial amount of prior 
art (p. 120).  Specifically, the authors argue that the CAFC has 
placed a greater emphasis on so-called secondary 
considerations in determining whether an invention is non-
obvious (p. 120).  Moreover, the authors point to several cases 
upholding patents as non-obvious because of a lack of a 
suggestion to combine the prior art references (p. 122).  The 
authors argue that those decisions “suggest that any patent 
application that entails a common sense combination of two 
previously well-known ideas must be granted, unless there is 
an explicit previous description of the particular combination 
that is described in the application” (pp. 122-23).  The authors 
                                                          
 39. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 40. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308; see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 181. 
 41. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub.L. 106-113, Div. B, § 
1000(a)(9) [Title IV (§§ 4001 to 4808)], 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-552 (codified at 
various sections of 35 U.S.C. (2000)). 
 42. 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000). 
MIRELES_4-24-05 7/11/2006  6:45:26 PM 
722 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 6:2 
 
do not advocate for an elimination of the use of “secondary 
considerations” or the “suggestion or motivation to combine” 
test.  The use of the “suggestion or motivation to combine” test 
is designed to prevent the use of hindsight construction in 
determining patentability.43  In other words, almost anything is 
obvious after someone shows it to you—arguably that is just a 
part of human nature.  The “suggestion or motivation to 
combine” test attempts to inject certainty, understandability, 
and applicability into suits determined by judges and juries.44  
Generally, suggestion or motivation does not have to explicitly 
appear in a prior art reference, but also can be derived from the 
knowledge of those skilled in the art, including an Examiner’s 
personal knowledge.45  Recent Federal Circuit cases have, 
however, required that the knowledge of those skilled in the art 
must be somehow explicitly noted (pp. 122-23).  This makes 
sense because an accused infringer could merely pay an expert 
willing to state that a suggestion or motivation is present in the 
knowledge of those skilled in the art, and the question would 
degenerate into a credibility assessment. 
Finally, the CAFC is increasingly relying upon juries in 
patent cases (p. 123).  According to the authors, the use of 
juries in patent cases was historically rare because of judicial 
skepticism that juries could understand complex technical, 
legal, and business issues and the difficulty of appellate review 
of the unexpressed reasoning of juries versus having the 
reasoning of a district court judge expressed in an order (p. 
124).  Additionally, and importantly, many patent attorneys 
believe juries are too sympathetic to patent holders (p. 124).  
Indeed, one study found that in 299 cases between 1989 and 
1996, juries found patents to be valid over two-thirds of the 
time (p. 125).  In contrast, when judges ruled the patent holder 
was upheld less than forty-seven percent of the time (p. 125).  
Another study found that between 1999 and 2000, juries were 
                                                          
 43. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.; In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Nies, C.J., 
concurring) (“Such suggestion or motivation to combine prior art teachings can 
derive solely from the existence of a teaching, which one of ordinary skill in 
the art would be presumed to know, and the use of that teaching to solve the 
same or similar problem which it addresses.”); see also PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2145(X)(A) (8th ed. 
2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
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two times as likely to uphold patents as were judges (p. 125).46 
Jaffe and Lerner’s proposed solutions to the asserted 
problems do not go so far as to advocate for abolition of the 
CAFC.  First, notwithstanding the effect of purported 
undesirable and unintended consequences flowing from its 
decisions, it is important to note that the CAFC was created for 
a good reason.  Second, the CAFC is fulfilling its purpose of 
creating a uniform body of patent law.47  Third, the CAFC has 
issued many opinions that attempt to limit the scope of patents, 
and several doctrines operate to curb the enforcement of 
dubious patents. 
The CAFC was created at a time when the United States 
was very concerned about its competitive position compared 
with Japan.  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United 
States was no longer viewed as an innovator.  Some believed 
that part of the problem with the United States’ overall 
innovation process was the uncertainty in the enforceability of 
patents.48  District court and appellate court judges, when 
confronted with patents, often viewed the patent as an 
impermissible monopoly and would find the patent invalid or 
construe the claims so narrowly there could be no 
infringement.49  Each regional circuit in the United States 
developed its own patent law with some circuits exhibiting 
more patent-friendly behavior than others. 
The story is told of then-Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
Judge Thurgood Marshall when he was visiting senators in 
preparation for his confirmation hearing as President 
Johnson’s nominee to the Supreme Court.  One well-known 
senator asked Judge Marshall what his views were on patents.  
The Judge reportedly responded, “I haven’t given patents much 
thought, Senator, because I’m from the Second Circuit and as 
                                                          
 46. See also Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: Who’s Asking?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 874 (2002). 
 47. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit 
Succeeding? An Empircal Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1105, 1174 (2004) (stating that, while the CAFC has not been an 
unqualified success, it is moving in the right direction).  For updated evidence, 
see CLAIMCONSTRUCTION.COM: A RESEARCH PROJECT ON THE 
INTERPRETATION OF PATENT LANGUAGE, at www.claimconstruction.com (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2005). 
 48. See The Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of The United States Court 
of Customs and Patent Appeals, 84 F.R.D. 429, 471-75 (May 9, 1979) 
(comments of Robert Benson).  
 49. See Simone A. Rose, Patent “Monopolyphobia”: A Means of 
Extinguishing the Fountainhead?, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 509, 527 (1999). 
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you know we don’t uphold patents in the Second Circuit.”50 
Thus, simply filing a declaratory judgment action of 
noninfringement or invalidity practically guaranteed victory in 
the case.  For example, between 1953-1977, patents were found 
valid and infringed on appeal in less than ten percent of the 
cases heard in the Eighth Circuit (p. 100).  In the Tenth 
Circuit, this number was almost sixty percent (p. 100). Thus 
forum shopping led to a system where the validity, 
enforceability and scope of patents were always in question.  
This degree of uncertainty fails to provide incentives to invent.  
Inventors and capitalists were unsure of whether to invest in 
the research and development of a particular product or even 
bear the costs of prosecuting a patent because it was unclear 
whether they will recoup the money invested in creation of that 
product. 
The CAFC has, by its very formation, created greater 
certainty in the patent law.51  While some may disagree with 
the outcomes of its decisions, the benefit of having one 
appellate court interpret and apply patent law is much more 
desirable than twelve courts with different positions.  This is 
particularly true because the Supreme Court rarely grants a 
writ of certiorari on a patent case.52  Furthermore, CAFC 
decisions concerning claim construction have increased the 
certainty associated with that art.  The anticipated en banc 
decision of the CAFC, Phillips v. AWH,53 will provide additional 
guidance in claim construction.  Moreover, the CAFC, in a 
quest for more certainty, attempted to reign in the doctrine of 
equivalents in the Festo case.54  However, the Supreme Court 
                                                          
 50. Hon. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The Creation of the Federal Circuit, in 
DONALD S. CHISUM, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 29-30 (1998). 
 51. See id. at 30; see also Prepared Remarks of James E. Rogan, Under 
Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office, at the Hearings on Competition and 
Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy (Feb. 
6, 2002), available at www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/rogan.htm (last visited Feb. 25 
2005).  Rogan stated that one of the developments in the last 20 years that has 
affected patent policy was “the establishment of the [CAFC].  The existence of 
a court of national jurisdiction for cases involving patents has been an 
invaluable tool.  By reducing jurisdictional conflicts that had preceded the 
court’s formation, the [CAFC] has made for a more stable patent system.”  Id. 
 52.  See Jared Goff, The Unpredictable Scope of the Waiver Resulting from 
the Advice-of-Counsel Defense to Willful Patent Infringement, 1998 BYU L. 
REV. 213, 216 (1998). 
 53. 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting en banc rehearing). 
 54. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 
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curtailed the effect of the CAFC’s attempt to limit the scope of 
patents with prosecution history estoppel.55  The CAFC has 
also limited the strength of patents with other doctrines, 
including the disclosure dedication rule of Johnson and 
Johnston Associates v. R.E. Service Co.56 and the prosecution 
laches doctrine of Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson 
Medical, Education & Research Foundation, Ltd.57  However, 
according to the decision in Independent Service Organizations 
Antitrust Ligigation v. Xerox,58 and much to the ire of the 
antitrust bar, the CAFC has apparently favored patents over 
the antitrust law in allowing the patentee the right to a 
unilateral refusal to sell or license without an inquiry into 
subjective motivation.59  Notably, in the refusal to deal context, 
a patentee may be subject to antitrust liability and treble 
damages if (1) the patentee’s acquisition of the litigated patents 
involved willful fraud on the Patent Office,60 or (2) the 
patentee’s infringement cause of action was a “mere sham to 
cover what is actually no more than an attempt to interfere 
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”61  The 
Xerox decision may have led to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,62 
which created uncertainty by allowing patent counterclaims to 
be heard in regional circuits instead of the CAFC.  
Commentators have made several proposals to change the 
result of the Vornado decision and the inconsistency it 
creates.63  A recent CAFC case provides some deference to the 
antitrust law by holding that there is a presumption of market 
                                                          
727-28 (2002). 
 55. Id. at 732. 
 56. 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that which is disclosed, 
but not claimed, is dedicated to the public domain). 
 57. 277 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 58. 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 59. See id. 
 60. Id. at 1326 (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. 
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965)). 
 61. Id. (citing E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 
365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)). 
 62. 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
 63. See generally Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under" Jurisdiction 
and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 253 (2003); 
Elizabeth I. Rogers, The Phoenix Precedents: The Unexpected Rebirth of 
Regional Circuit Jurisdiction Over Patent Appeals and the Need For a 
Considered Congressional Response, 16 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 411 (2003). 
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power in a patent.64  Finally, it is important to note that the 
defense of inequitable conduct that renders a patent 
unenforceable may deter undesired conduct, such as an 
attempt to enforce dubious patents. 
IV.  JAFFE AND LERNER: IT IS BROKEN—HOW DO WE 
FIX IT? 
A.  PROBLEMS WITH PATENT REFORM 
A clear “fix” to the patent system is a meaningful pre-grant 
opposition system that allows third parties to produce relevant 
prior art without penalizing the third party in later litigation.65  
Instead, we have a reexamination system that, 
notwithstanding several updates, is rendered ineffective by a 
limited number of issues covered in the reexamination process, 
ambiguities surrounding the litigation process, the prominent 
role given to examiners in reviewing their own work, and the 
fact that if you initiate the inter partes reexamination process 
and fail, your ability to challenge the patent in court are 
greatly restricted (p. 155).  The relatively new inter partes 
reexamination procedure was only used six times in the first 
three years the procedure was available (p. 155).  Why don’t we 
have a meaningful pre-grant opposition system?  The authors 
assert that the reason is unreasonable concern with harming 
small firms (pp. 156-57).  First, applicants would not be able to 
rely on trade secret law if their applications are published.  
Second, large firms may harass small firms by frequently 
opposing their patent applications, which can make it difficult 
for small firms to build their patent portfolios.66  These 
arguments, according to the authors, are flawed and have been 
used by commentators such as Oliver North and G. Gordon 
Liddy to derail any meaningful reform (p. 157). 
The authors rely on a body of work called “political 
                                                          
 64. See generally Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 396 
F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 65. See generally Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in 
Administrative Revocation of U.S. Patents: A Proposition for Opposition and 
Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 63 (1998). 
 66. But see Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent 
Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1300 (2003) 
(reporting that over 40% of interferences are filed by the party that is first to 
invent and last to file, but small inventors are not particularly benefiting from 
the first to invent system). 
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economy,” which emphasizes the danger of “capture” of 
government programs to explain why patent reform is not 
happening (p. 160). 
The theory of regulatory capture suggests that groups who have three 
shared characteristics will capture and control programs that create 
economic benefits: They stand to gain substantial benefits[;] [t]heir 
collective political activity is not too difficult to arrange[;] [and] [t]he 
parties who are most affected by their actions are highly dispersed 
and find it difficult to organize (p.160). 
According to the authors, several characteristics of the 
patent system that make capture likely are the complexity of 
the laws; the negative effects of bad patent policy are diffuse 
and difficult to see and understand; the policy debate 
concerning the “small inventor”; and lack of a common 
language between practitioners and scholars (pp. 160-61).  
Moreover, the patent bar has proven to be a powerful lobby 
advocating against change; small capital-constrained firms do 
not have the resources for lobbying efforts; the adverse 
consequences of a poorly functioning patent system are diffuse 
and indirect; and finally, the ultimate party harmed, the 
consumer, does not understand the adverse consequences of 
more expensive products due to litigation and royalties, and 
products that were either not brought to market or delayed in 
being brought to market (pp. 168-69). 
Having identified the problems with the current patent 
system, the authors focus their proposals for reform on the ease 
of obtaining a patent at the USPTO and the likelihood of 
success in enforcing a patent in the courts (pp. 170-71).  The 
authors begin their analysis by setting forth the conceptual 
framework and basis of their proposals (pp. 170-71).  First, the 
authors set out three generally agreed upon goals for the 
patent system.  These include: (a) improving patent quality by 
ensuring that only inventions that are truly novel and 
nonobvious are patented, that the patent procurement process 
is quick and reliable, and that the patents that are issued 
provide an adequate property right to protect investment in the 
invention; (b) reducing uncertainty, which includes the 
uncertainty that innovators have that an unknown or untested 
patent will be asserted against them; and (c) keeping costs 
under control (pp. 171-172).  Second, the authors assert that 
there are some very basic truths about patent reform.  
According to the authors, patent examination will never be 
perfect.  Better examination will require more resources, and 
since most patents are worthless and unimportant, throwing 
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more money at the examination process is generally not 
helpful.   
In spite of this truth, the authors disagree with Mark 
Lemley’s “rational ignorance” theory, which posits that society 
is rationally choosing to remain ignorant about which patents 
should be granted and that it is reasonably efficient to accept 
poor examination quality and let courts sort out the validity of 
the patents that truly matter (p. 174).67  Instead, the authors 
believe that the current patent system is not working in an 
acceptably efficient manner (p. 175).  In particular, they believe 
the intangible cost of low quality patents does not just include 
the cost of litigation, but also includes uncertainty created by 
overlapping dubious patents which reduces the incentive to 
invest in innovation (p. 175).  Moreover, the loss of products 
and services that never make it to market because of an 
abandoned development due to threatened litigation or 
licensing costs is high (p. 175).68   
In addition, issuing bad patents encourages bad 
applications to be filed.  Potential litigants also respond to how 
courts behave, that is if courts make it easier to enforce 
patents, litigants will file more law suits. There is also a need 
for a strong incentive to get more information to the PTO to 
prevent the issuance of patents that would not have issued if 
that information was before the PTO.69  And finally, an 
improved recalibration of the system can be achieved with “a 
better balance between rapid approval of good applications and 
                                                          
 67.  See also Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In 
Search of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219 
(2004) (criticizing rational ignorance theory); John R. Thomas, The 
Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent 
Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727 (2002) (criticizing 
rational ignorance theory).  For a discussion of the theory see Mark A. Lemley, 
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001). 
 68.  See generally Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to 
Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office 
Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 943 (2004) (arguing that litigation is an poor substitute for 
adequate patent examination at the USPTO and suggest better funding for 
the USPTO, higher standards for initial review, better incentives for 
applicants to find and disclose prior art information, and the creation of a 
cheap and workable administrative post-issue review). 
 69. The authors recognize that providing an opportunity for competitors 
to present information to defeat a patent can “gum up the works” (p. 177).  
Competitors will be opportunistic and attempt to delay a potentially valid 
patent and that will increase the cost, uncertainty, and delay for valid patent 
applications (p. 177). 
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reliable rejection of bad ones, and do it without dramatically 
increased resources” by paying attention to the incentives that 
different reforms create for desirable and undesirable behavior 
(p. 178). 
B.  MULTIPLE-TIERED SYSTEM OF REVIEWING PATENTS 
To balance the need to bring in more information with the 
fact that most patents are unimportant, the authors propose a 
multi-tiered system of reviewing patents and patent 
applications (pp. 179-81).  Accordingly, patents that are 
unimportant and unlikely to be the subject of litigation would 
receive the current examination practice (p. 181).  For the more 
important patents, parties would have an incentive and 
opportunities to bring information to the USPTO, and the 
USPTO would at least be able to make an informed, if not 
always the correct, decision of validity on patents (p. 181).  
First, the application process would proceed as it currently 
operates; the applicant files their application and the examiner 
reviews it (p. 180).  Second, prior to issuance of the patent, a 
public notice of the intention to issue the patent would be 
followed by an opportunity in which third parties could submit 
relevant prior art (p. 180).  This “pre-grant opposition” would 
only allow the submission of prior art and does not give a third 
party the opportunity to argue their case or use legal discovery 
to produce additional evidence of prior art (p. 180).  Third, 
assuming the patent issues, there is an opportunity to file a 
request for a reexamination (p. 180).  The request must have a 
stated basis, and the request may be denied by the USPTO (p. 
180).  If allowed, an independent examiner would undertake 
the reexamination with the opportunity for third parties to 
make arguments regarding patentability (p. 180). 
C. THE PRE-GRANT OPPOSITION PROCEEDING 
The pre-grant opposition proceeding, similar to the 
trademark opposition procedure, allows parties an opportunity 
to present relevant information to the Patent Office.  The 
current patent system does not provide any meaningful 
opportunity for third parties to provide information to the 
USPTO (p. 182).  For example, under USPTO rules, a third 
party can protest a filed, but unpublished application by 
arguing grounds related to patentability.  However, the protest 
has to be filed before the application is published by the 
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USPTO.70  Thus, third parties must submit an argument that 
the patent is invalid without knowing what invention is 
claimed in the patent application, unless they somehow 
independently obtain this information—perhaps through trade 
secret misappropriation (p. 182).  Moreover, the limited 
proposal by the authors merely allows the opportunity to 
present information—not gum up the system with legal 
argument and posturing (p. 182).  The most important tactical 
concern is what will be the legal effect of providing prior art to 
the examiner if the examiner decides to issue the patent 
notwithstanding the prior art.  More succinctly, how does this 
affect the issue of legal validity of the patent in a future forum?  
Generally, new prior art not before the examiner during 
examination is very persuasive evidence of the invalidity of the 
patent in court (p. 182).  Moreover, the decision of the court is 
closer to a final decision than an administrative decision of the 
USPTO.  Most litigation attorneys and patent prosecutors will 
likely counsel against using a pre-grant opposition if there is 
the danger of a legal presumption that the patent is valid in 
light of that prior art.  The authors argue that there should be 
no legal presumption regarding the validity of the patent over 
the art provided by the outside party, thus there should not be 
a concern over “wasting good stuff” on an examiner (p. 183).  
This, however, does not give any deference to the decision of the 
examiner.  The authors argue this is warranted because the 
third party has not had the opportunity to make any express 
arguments (p. 183). 
D.  THE POST-GRANT THIRD PARTY REEXAMINATION 
The second prong of the authors’ approach to improve the 
quality of issued patents is the opportunity for a meaningful 
third party reexamination (p. 184).71  This meaningful third 
                                                          
 70. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE, supra note 45, § 1901.04. 
 71. See generally Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a 
Viable Administrative Revocation System for US Patent Law, 11 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 1 (1997) (proposing adoption of a model based on the U.S. trademark 
system inter partes administration procedures or the European Patent 
Convention post-grant opposition practice); see also Bronwyn H. Hall & 
Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the US Patent System—Design 
Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989 (2004) (The article 
discusses how U.S. patent quality has been deteriorating and “reviewing the 
impact of post-grant review mechanisms as advocated by the policy review 
boards.”). 
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party reexamination is balanced against a desire to ensure that 
competitors are not strategically using the process to delay or 
obstruct the granting of a patent (p. 184).  The meaningful 
third party examination also ensures that resources are only 
expended on a few patents and that there is an opportunity for 
outside information to be brought to the USPTO’s attention (p. 
184).  According to the authors, the current reexamination 
system’s rules are tipped too far toward protecting against 
strategic use of the system to delay the granting of the patent 
(p. 187).  Some of those rules include: a right to appeal if the re-
examination results in a withdrawn patent grant, but not if the 
patent is not withdrawn; the party initiating the reexamination 
is prohibited from making any argument concerning validity 
that could have been made in the reexamination in a future 
litigation; and the only evidence concerning validity that can be 
produced are patents and printed publications (p. 187).  The 
authors argue that in order to ensure that there are proper 
incentives to bring information to the USPTO and prohibit 
strategic use designed to delay a patent grant, the following 
proposals should be adopted: third parties should be able to 
bring forth any factual evidence and not be limited to patents 
and printed publications; parties should only be barred from 
making specific arguments made to the USPTO during the 
reexamination in future litigation; reexaminations should be 
only conducted by a group of reexaminers; and the patentee 
and challenger should have the right to appeal the USPTO’s 
decision (p. 188).  Finally, the authors assert that there should 
be a “non-trivial” fee, such as $50,000, to initiate a 
reexamination, and that if the challenge is successful, the 
patent applicant should pay that fee along with the challenger’s 
legal fees (pp. 188-89).  If the challenge is not successful, the 
authors argue that the challenger should reimburse the 
applicant’s costs of defending the patent (p. 189). 
The proposed fee structure would likely impact small 
inventors and companies unable to pay that amount when 
presented with a challenge.  The $50,000 fee coupled with the 
prospect of paying your own as well as the opponent’s legal fees 
is a tremendous burden which may serve to provide a 
disincentive to pursue a patent or abandon a patent.  This in 
turn could lead to less investment in innovation as firms are 
unable to obtain reimbursement for their research and 
development costs.  Indeed, the authors admit that “the 
knowledge that this expensive and unattractive prospect likely 
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lies at the end of the road will discourage marginal applicants 
from filing patent applications in the first place” (p. 189).  
Finding the appropriate amount of cost to initiate the 
reexamination while providing the proper incentives and 
disincentives is also particularly difficult because of the 
difference in value or potential value of different types of 
innovations such as pharmaceuticals.  The prospect of delaying 
the issuance of a patent on a pharmaceutical that serves as a 
substitute to another pharmaceutical that is covered by a 
patent could mean millions of dollars in market share for a 
period of time.  The fee structure may need to be staggered for 
different types of innovations and perhaps small inventors or 
companies could be excluded from operation of the legal fees 
provision making the loser bear the winner’s fees. 
Finally, the authors also add that the initial examination 
should be improved through a rethinking of the goals of the 
USPTO and the definition of productivity along with additional 
funding necessary to hire, retain, and train examiners and 
update its information systems (p. 191).  Unquestionably, these 
reforms would improve the quality of reexamination. 
E.  JUDGES INSTEAD OF JURIES 
The second prong of analysis presented by the authors 
includes addressing the CAFC’s unbalanced attitude toward 
protecting patent rights.  First, the authors attack the 
presumption of validity accorded to patents which dictates that 
the challenger must prove the invalidity of patent by clear and 
convincing evidence (p. 192).  The logic underpinning this rule 
is that the decision making accorded to administrative bodies 
should be given some weight (p. 193).  However, given the 
authors’ prior arguments concerning the poor quality of issued 
patents and the “Rational Ignorance principal,” the authors 
assert that there is a strong argument for eradicating the 
presumption (p. 193).  However, the authors do not push the 
argument that far and recognize the patent grant must be 
worth something otherwise investors would not invest in new 
technologies because the there would not be even a nominal 
guarantee that they would be able to recoup their investment 
in the technology and the procurement of the patent (pp. 193-
94).  As a result, the authors argue that keeping the 
presumption intact is prudent if their prior proposals 
concerning pre-grant oppositions and reexamination are 
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adopted (p. 194).72  The presumption will carry more meaning 
when examiners have relevant prior art to consider during 
examination and third parties will have had the meaningful 
opportunity to challenge the patent (p. 194). 
Second, the authors assert that difficult technical evidence 
along with the clear and convincing burden of proof standard 
makes it likely that a jury will be more likely to find in favor of 
a patentee (pp. 195-96).  The common argument in defense of 
jurors is that it is fair to be judged by your peers instead of a 
judge, a principle of Anglo-American law (p. 196).  However, 
this concept bears less weight because a jury of a patentee’s 
peers is likely other scientists, engineers, or experienced 
members of a particular business, not your member of the 
general public (p. 196).  The authors assert that judges are 
more used to technical evidence and have a greater ability to 
sort through that evidence in comparison to the lay juror, and 
can appoint a special master to serve as an expert (p. 196).  The 
authors further argue that there is no good distinction between 
mandating that judges should interpret claims and not juries, 
but then leave technical decisions concerning novelty and 
nonobviousness to juries and not judges (p. 196).  The judge 
could construe the obviousness and novelty of a patented 
invention and leave the ultimate question of obviousness and 
novelty to the jury as is essentially done with infringement (pp. 
196-97).  Judges likely have a higher education level than the 
average jury member and thus, may be better suited to 
understand the complexities of patent law and the technology 
at issue.73  There is little doubt that that would be true for 
special masters.  This proposal would likely lead to more 
predictability in patent litigation, and may reduce the 
likelihood that a jury may be swayed by a persuasive theme at 
trial surrounding the toils of the inventor. 
V.  JAFFE AND LERNER’S FINAL THOUGHTS 
The authors also address the argument that patent law 
should be tailored to specific technologies (p. 198).  The authors 
offer compelling arguments against such proposals and assert 
                                                          
 72. This is contrary to the position proposed by the Federal Trade 
Commission.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 18, at 8. 
 73. Cf. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) 
(holding that claim construction is a question of law to be decided by the judge 
and is not subject to a Seventh Amendment guarantee that a jury will 
determine the meaning of claim terms). 
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the better solution is to repair the system as a whole, 
particularly with software and business methods, where the 
prior art is in the hands of industry members and not readily 
accessible to patent examiners (pp. 199-200).  The authors 
review specific innovations such as business methods, and 
argue no distinction should be made between inventions 
brought forth through the use of science versus a method of 
doing business (p. 199).  The proper policy question is whether 
the patent system is encouraging the development of new 
products and processes (pp. 199-200).  Business methods 
require the investment of time and money to develop and may 
require patent protection to prevent free riding (p. 200).  The 
problems with the issuance of software patents stems from a 
difficulty in allowing claims to issue on innovations that are not 
new or nonobvious (p. 200).  This problem is not specific to 
software (p. 203).  Similarly, for biotechnology research tools, if 
the tool is novel and nonobvious then the patent should issue 
(p. 203).  It is not unreasonable to require a royalty in that 
situation (p. 203).  Finally, the authors argue that differential 
treatment between technologies is very difficult to implement 
and “there will be an inevitable tendency for people to position 
themselves to get the most favorable treatment” (p. 204).  The 
authors point to current gaming of the patent system made 
possible by Congress’s willingness to pass technology-specific 
laws such as the inclusion, in President Bush’s domestic 
security legislation, of a provision protecting a vaccine made by 
a pharmaceutical company (pp. 204-05).  This provision became 
law notwithstanding the current fact that neither anyone on 
Capitol Hill or in the White House is willing to admit inserting 
it into a domestic security bill (p. 205).  This behavior would 
only intensify with presumptions treating technologies 
differently (p. 205). 
CONCLUSION 
Jaffe and Lerner offer a balanced, thoughtful analysis of 
the patent system and reform efforts.  While recognizing the 
importance that certain and strong patent rights provide, the 
authors offer proposals which will greatly improve the quality 
of patents and provide the necessary certainty that inventors 
and investors require to invest time and money in researching 
and developing new innovations.  Their two tiered approach to 
solve the problems of the patent system attacks the current 
system at its weakest points:  the issuance of weak patent 
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grants from the USPTO and the liberal upholding of the 
validity of weak patents.  The implementation of a pre-grant 
opposition proceeding, allowing for admission of additional 
relevant prior art for consideration by the examiner, would 
certainly reduce the issuance of weak patents.  Moreover, the 
post grant reexamination proceeding would allow for a further 
review of weak patents, while preventing abuse of the system 
by competitors of the patent holder.  Based on this system for 
the USPTO, the CAFC’s presumption of validity for issued 
patents will carry more meaning.  In addition, their second tier 
for solving the patent system would have the CAFC rely on 
more determinations by a judge rather than a relatively 
unsophisticated jury.  This will provide truer results in cases 
questioning a patent’s validity.  The proposed plan’s only 
weakness can be found in practical applications of certain 
ideas.  For example, the “non-trivial” fee for initiating a post 
grant reexamination might actually lead to abuse by certain 
parties while also preventing genuine claims from being 
brought forth.  However, by taking into account the goal 
intended by reform of the current patent system and the 
interests of inventors, businesses, and the Congress, the 
authors’ recalibration of the current system would rectify many 
of the current patent system’s problems without destabilizing 
the very purposes of the system.  
